The NTRU lattice is a promising candidate to construct practical
cryptosystems resistant to quantum computing attacks, and particularly plays a
leading role in the ongoing NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization. On
the one hand, it is benefited from a strong security guarantee since it has
essentially not been broken over 24 years. On the other hand, all the known
patent threats against NTRU have expired, which is deemed a critical factor for
consideration when deploying PQC algorithms in reality. Nevertheless, there are
still some obstacles to the computational efficiency and bandwidth complexity
of NTRU-based constructions of key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM). To address
these issues, we propose a compact and efficient KEM based on the NTRU lattice,
called CTRU, by introducing a scalable ciphertext compression technique. It
demonstrates a new approach to decrypting NTRU ciphertext, where the plaintext
message is recovered with the aid of our decoding algorithm in the scalable
${E}_8$ lattice. The instantiation of CTRU is over the NTT-friendly rings of
the form $mathbb{Z}_q[x]/(x^{n}-x^{n/2}+1)$. To our knowledge, our CTRU is the
most bandwidth efficient KEM based on the NTRU lattice up to now. In addition,
compared to other NTRU-based KEM schemes, CTRU has stronger security against
known attacks, enjoys more robust CCA security reduction (starting from IND-CPA
rather than OW-CPA), and its encapsulation and decapsulation processes are also
among the most efficient. When compared to the NIST Round 3 finalist NTRU-HRSS,
our CTRU-768 has $15%$ smaller ciphertext size and its security is
strengthened by $(45,40)$ bits for classical and quantum security respectively.
When compared to the NIST Round 3 finalist Kyber that is based on the
Module-LWE assumption, CTRU has both smaller bandwidth and lower error
probabilities at about the same security level.