A k-anonymous broadcast can be implemented using a small group of dining
cryptographers to first share the message, followed by a flooding phase started
by group members. Members have little incentive to forward the message in a
timely manner, as forwarding incurs costs, or they may even profit from keeping
the message. In worst case, this leaves the true originator as the only sender,
rendering the dining-cryptographers phase useless and compromising their
privacy. We present a novel approach using a modified dining-cryptographers
protocol to distributed shares of an (n,k)-Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.
Finally, all group members broadcast their received share through the network,
allowing any recipient of k shares to reconstruct the message, enforcing
anonymity. If less than k group members broadcast their shares, the message
cannot be decoded thus preventing privacy breaches for the originator. Our
system provides (n-|attackers|)-anonymity for up to k-1 attackers and has
little performance impact on dissemination. We show these results in a security
analysis and performance evaluation based on a proof-of-concept prototype.
Throughput rates between 10 and 100 kB/s are enough for many real applications
with high privacy requirements, e.g., financial blockchain system.

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Author Of this post: <a href="http://arxiv.org/find/cs/1/au:+Modinger_D/0/1/0/all/0/1">David M&#xf6;dinger</a>, <a href="http://arxiv.org/find/cs/1/au:+Dispan_J/0/1/0/all/0/1">Juri Dispan</a>, <a href="http://arxiv.org/find/cs/1/au:+Hauck_F/0/1/0/all/0/1">Franz J. Hauck</a>

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