Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) attacks present numerous threats to a smart grid. In
a MiTM attack, an intruder embeds itself within a conversation between two
devices to either eavesdrop or impersonate one of the devices, making it appear
to be a normal exchange of information. Thus, the intruder can perform false
data injection (FDI) and false command injection (FCI) attacks that can
compromise power system operations, such as state estimation, economic
dispatch, and automatic generation control (AGC). Very few researchers have
focused on MiTM methods that are difficult to detect within a smart grid. To
address this, we are designing and implementing multi-stage MiTM intrusions in
an emulation-based cyber-physical power system testbed against a large-scale
synthetic grid model to demonstrate how such attacks can cause physical
contingencies such as misguided operation and false measurements. MiTM
intrusions create FCI, FDI, and replay attacks in this synthetic power grid.
This work enables stakeholders to defend against these stealthy attacks, and we
present detection mechanisms that are developed using multiple alerts from
intrusion detection systems and network monitoring tools. Our contribution will
enable other smart grid security researchers and industry to develop further
detection mechanisms for inconspicuous MiTM attacks.

Go to Source of this post
Author Of this post: <a href="">Patrick Wlazlo</a>, <a href="">Abhijeet Sahu</a>, <a href="">Zeyu Mao</a>, <a href="">Hao Huang</a>, <a href="">Ana Goulart</a>, <a href="">Katherine Davis</a>, <a href="">Saman Zonouz</a>

By admin