Most computer science conferences rely on paper bidding to assign reviewers
to papers. Although paper bidding enables high-quality assignments in days of
unprecedented submission numbers, it also opens the door for dishonest
reviewers to adversarially influence paper reviewing assignments. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that some reviewers bid on papers by “friends” or colluding
authors, even though these papers are outside their area of expertise, and
recommend them for acceptance without considering the merit of the work. In
this paper, we study the efficacy of such bid manipulation attacks and find
that, indeed, they can jeopardize the integrity of the review process. We
develop a novel approach for paper bidding and assignment that is much more
robust against such attacks. We show empirically that our approach provides
robustness even when dishonest reviewers collude, have full knowledge of the
assignment system’s internal workings, and have access to the system’s inputs.
In addition to being more robust, the quality of our paper review assignments
is comparable to that of current, non-robust assignment approaches.

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Author Of this post: <a href="http://arxiv.org/find/cs/1/au:+Wu_R/0/1/0/all/0/1">Ruihan Wu</a>, <a href="http://arxiv.org/find/cs/1/au:+Guo_C/0/1/0/all/0/1">Chuan Guo</a>, <a href="http://arxiv.org/find/cs/1/au:+Wu_F/0/1/0/all/0/1">Felix Wu</a>, <a href="http://arxiv.org/find/cs/1/au:+Kidambi_R/0/1/0/all/0/1">Rahul Kidambi</a>, <a href="http://arxiv.org/find/cs/1/au:+Maaten_L/0/1/0/all/0/1">Laurens van der Maaten</a>, <a href="http://arxiv.org/find/cs/1/au:+Weinberger_K/0/1/0/all/0/1">Kilian Q. Weinberger</a>

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