NTRU is regarded as an appealing finalist due to its long history against all known attacks and relatively high efficiency. In the third round of the NIST competition, the submitted NTRU cryptosystem is the merger of NTRU-HPS and NTRU-HRSS. In 2019, Ding et al. have analyzed the case when the public key is reused for the original NTRU scheme. However, NTRU-HRSS selects coefficients in an arbitrary way, instead of fixed-weight sample spaces in the original NTRU and NTRU-HPS. Therefore, their method cannot be applied to NTRU-HRSS. To address this problem, we propose a full key mismatch attack on NTRU-HRSS. Firstly, we find a longest chain which helps us in recovering the following coefficients. Next, the most influential interference factors are eliminated by increasing the weight of targeted coefficients. In this step, we adaptively select the weights according to the feedbacks of the oracle to avoid errors. Finally, experiments show that we succeed in recovering all coefficients of the secret key in NTRU-HRSS with a success rate of $93.6%$. Furthermore, we illustrate the trade-off among the success rate, average number of queries, and average time. Particularly, we show that when the success rate is 93.6%, it has the minimum number of queries at the same time.

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